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What is This?
The Enclave Society: Towards a Sociology of Immobility

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Abstract
In contemporary sociology, there has been significant interest in the idea of mobility, the decline of the nation state, the rise of flexible citizenship, and the porous quality of political boundaries. There is much talk of medicine without borders and sociology without borders. These social developments are obviously linked to the processes of globalization, leading some to argue that we need a ‘sociology beyond society’ in order to account for these flows and global networks. In this article, I propose an alternative analysis. There are important developments involving the securitization of modern societies that create significant forms of immobility. One striking illustration is the increasing use of walls to quarantine or secure territories and communities against outsiders or to regulate the flow of migrants in Israel, in Europe and along the Mexican-US border. Modern societies are in particular characterized by a deep contradiction between the economic need for labour mobility and the state’s political need to assert sovereignty. Gated societies, ghettoes, quarantine zones, prisons, camps and similar arrangements are in many respects pre-modern institutions of spatial regulation for political ends. Contemporary technical developments in biomedicine offer new opportunities for political control and spatial regulation in terms of forensic policing, bio-tattooing and bioprofiling. Globalization paradoxically produces significant forms of immobility for political regulation of persons alongside the mobility of goods and services.

Key words
■ borders ■ enclavement ■ immobility regime ■ quarantine ■ sequestration

Sociology Without Frontiers

Sociological theories of globalization have encouraged us to believe that social boundaries are disappearing and that the social world is a system of global flows and networks. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of political mobility was the collapse of the Berlin Wall, which had been a major statement of Cold War
politics. In the euphoria of the final decade of the twentieth century, the prospect of peaceful globalization had never looked better. In response to these political changes, there was a general sense that political borders and cultural boundaries were coming down. This view of modern societies is associated with the work of sociologists such as Anthony Giddens and John Urry who have criticized mainstream sociology for its alleged focus on nation states. In the millennium issue of the *British Journal of Sociology*, Urry advocated ‘mobile sociology’ (2000), and this vision of a changing social world was widely shared in the 1990s. The notion that a network society had replaced an earlier form of capitalism was developed by Manuel Castells (1996) in *The Rise of Network Society* and by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) in *The New Spirit of Capitalism*.

The idea of mobile sociology was in part a result of the fruitful interaction between geography and sociology in the so-called spatial turn. The spread of information technology, the global flow of goods, the deregulation of financial markets, and the opening up and expansion of the European Union encouraged the view in the 1980s and 1990s that a new type of sociology was required. With the impact of globalization on political institutions, there has been widespread discussion of the possibility of global citizenship and world governance. With the emergence of the European Union, this debate has included the notion that the character of nation-state citizenship would be transformed. Social anthropologists have also studied the problem of identity in modern societies with the growth of transnationalism and diasporic cultures in terms of ‘transnationality’ (Ong, 1999), ‘flexible citizenship’ (2005) and the ‘mutations in citizenship’ (Ong, 2006). The legacy of T. H. Marshall’s theory of citizenship and the welfare state (1950) has been criticized, because allegedly it cannot encompass these social and political changes resulting from globalization. In this debate about political borders, sociologists have attempted to show, for example, that migrant workers in Europe have acquired important rights despite the fact that they do not fully enjoy the status of formal citizenship (Soysal, 1994). The implication is that rights can be gained and enjoyed outside the boundaries of the nation state, and hence the barriers defending citizenship as an exclusionary form of membership have become increasingly negotiable.

Urry is clearly correct to emphasize global flows and networks as key features of the modern world. However, as the economy becomes increasingly global, especially in terms of the flow of finance, investment and commodities, states and their bureaucracies have in many respects become more rigid in attempting to defend the principle of sovereignty. There is, as a result, a profound contradiction between the economic requirements of flexibility and fluidity and the state’s objective of defending its territorial sovereignty. In particular with the growth of a global war on terror after 9/11, states, rather than becoming more porous, have defended their borders with increasing determination. From a historical perspective, it is useful to remind ourselves that the flow of people has become more rather than less restrictive. John Torpey (2000) has argued that ‘the invention of the passport’ as a method of surveillance and regulation was a product of twentieth-century statehood. In a similar fashion Saskia Sassen (1999)
in *Guests and Aliens* showed how the free flow of workers in Europe, that had been traditional during harvest time, was changed by the transformation of such guests into political aliens. My argument is that, while there may be an increasing global flow of goods and services, there is emerging a parallel ‘immobility regime’ exercising surveillance and control over migrants, refugees and other aliens. If sociology is to be criticized, it is not because it has neglected globalization; it is because it has neglected the rise of global security systems whose stated aim is to protect residential populations against the perceived risk of mobile populations.

The changing mood of the social sciences against the argument that societies are becoming more porous and borders are disappearing was perhaps sharply illustrated by the special issue of the *European Journal of Social Theory* in 2006. This issue noted in particular that ‘in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the more recent acts of terrorism in Bali, Madrid and London, governments have began to reassess their border-opening policies’ (Newman, 2006: 181). Proponents of globalization need to recognize the fact that ‘territory and re-territorialization, at a variety of spatial scales, remain a major form of societal organization and ordering’ (Newman, 2006: 183). The principal causes of re-territorialization are said to be: the development of policies of securitization, the terrorist threat to urban centres and civil society, the growth in negative sentiments towards immigration and foreign workers, and a social mood that is hostile to cosmopolitanism. The empirical evidence concerning European racism is ample (Semyonov et al., 2006). There is in any case a widespread view that associates immigrants with poverty, prostitution, disease, drug offences and violence. Where there is low trust, there is a growing sense of the offensive nature of juvenile crime and vandalism, and this incivility is increasingly associated with migrant communities and especially with their dislodged and alienated young men. As Abdelmalek Sayad (2004: 282) observes in his *The Suffering of the Immigrant*, migration has produced a new ‘state thought’ in which the criminality of the migrant has become ontological, ‘because, at the deepest level of our mode of thought (i.e state thought) it is synonymous with the very existence of the immigrant and with the very fact of immigration’. By 1987, one-third of prisoners in Belgium, Switzerland and France came from foreign and ethnic minority communities. The relationship between illegal or irregular migrant status and crime is particularly problematic (Engbersen et al., 2006) and hence there is a widespread sense of the need by governments for new policies to control migration (Guiraudon and Joppke, 2001). Of course, migrants are not the only pool of displaced youth ready to be recruited or forced into criminal roles. In more general terms, young men find themselves confined to certain areas of the city, that is, they experience ‘back street territorialization’ – a process that can also give them some degree of control of this space. For example, South African marginal youth occupy *die agterbuurde* somewhat out of the direct control or regulation by the state (Jensen, 2006).

The argument against the theory of global mobilities has been systematically captured by Ronen Shamir (2005) in the concept of a ‘mobility regime’, which describes the paradox that globalization also produces new systems of closure. There is a ‘paradigm of suspicion’ in which various categories of persons are seen...
to be dangerous, and hence their movements need to be contained and curtailed. Hence there is a need to conceptualize globalization as also involving ‘closure, entrapment and containment’ (Shamir, 2005: 199). The result is an emerging risk-management system that has a global reach. If we regard the freedom to be mobile as a resource, it is clear that the capacities for mobility are unequally shared by any population and hence there is what Shamir calls a ‘mobility gap’ that is somewhat parallel to the ‘information gap’ and the ‘digital divide’. Finally, Shamir detects an evolution of these systems from ‘elementary forms’ (walls and fences) to more complex systems (involving, for example, the use of forensic medicine and bioprofiling). While Shamir’s contribution to this debate is substantial, I have two minor comments on his approach. First, his idea of a ‘mobility regime’ should be re-titled the ‘immobility regime’ and, second, the notion of biological closure can usefully be elaborated through a consideration of the work of Giorgio Agamben (1998) on sovereignty and bare life.

I propose to synthesize and to develop these notions into a theory of ‘enclave society’. In such a society, governments and other agencies seek to regulate spaces and, where necessary, to immobilize flows of people, goods and services. These sequestrations, exclusions and closures are: (1) military-political; (2) social and cultural; and (3) biological. To describe these processes that seek to exercise governmentality, often in extreme form, over populations by enclosure, bureaucratic barriers, legal exclusions and registrations, we can invent the general idea of modern ‘enclavement’ as a set of strategies and tactics for both domestic and international regulation. Rather than mobilities, we have the emergence of an immobility regime of gated communities (for the elderly), ghettos (for migrants, legal and illegal), imprisonment and a range of related practices (tagging) for criminals and deviants, and increasingly the need for quarantine to ensure biological containment (against the resurgence of tuberculosis, the advance of SARS and HIV/AIDS and the threat of a catastrophic pandemic of avian flu).

At an everyday level, there are many illustrations of immobility through such spatial closures. These are often benign: security zones, frequent-flyer lounges, prayer rooms and no-smoking areas in airports, women-only railway carriages in Japan, or private rooms in public hospitals. Many of these practices and institutions are ancient (such as the Great Wall of China and quarantine in plague-stricken medieval Europe), but with modern information technology, microbiological innovations and nanotechnology, there are a range of techniques that are becoming available to states – in particular to control global flows of slavery, business crime, terrorism, and war lordism. The causes of the rise of enclave society are numerous – globalization of crime and disease, ‘the return of the state’, securitization, illegal migration, political paranoia, technical innovations, and so forth. The umbrella notion that explains these developments is ‘the war on terror’. In this article, however, I concentrate in particular on the idea of a new xenophobia as part of a modern culture of fear or the paradigm of suspicion, as Shamir calls it.

While the creation of physical and bureaucratic fences to control migrants has been much discussed, the biological dimensions of enclavement are perhaps the most interesting. Following the reflections of Agamben on ‘bare life’, we can
foresee a new apparatus of bio-sequestration, exclusion and regulation. Guan- 
tanamo Bay is probably the ultimate conversion of city life into the camp. These 
developments constitute a global process of enclavement resulting in an immo-
bility not a mobility regime.

We can consider modern enclavement as taking three principal forms: (1) 
sequestration; (2) storage; and (3) seclusion. The isolation or sequestration 
of populations could be regarded as the most basic form of social regulation with the 
aim of protecting host populations from infectious disease or from dangerous 
persons who are regarded as morally or biologically undesirable. In the 1930s, 
European campaigns to achieve ‘racial hygiene’ promoted the idea of national 
fitness and eugenics strategies included negative measures such as sterilization to 
biologically sequester the unfit. Negative eugenics, being obsessed by the notion 
of degeneration, became preoccupied with the problem of the mentally ill. These 
measures were not only part of a fascist ideology but were also embraced by social 
democracies as aspects of public health policies (Mazower, 1999: 97). Such prac-
tices that sequester special sections of the population may be regarded as essen-
tially illustrations of what Max Weber understood as rationalization. By contrast, 
the creation of gated communities to protect the elderly or the vulnerable is 
designed, not to keep out threats from the outside, but to protect local communi-
ties from internal dangers (possibly from self-harm). With the rapid ageing of 
the populations of the developed world and increasing life expectancy, a range 
of strategies has also emerged for the management of the elderly; these include 
the growth of overseas retirement villages, homes for the elderly and increasingly 
luxury cruise ships. Because it is unlikely that the deeply aged will ever return to 
the labour force, these strategies are best conceptualized as ‘social storage’.

Finally, there is a range of new laws and technologies that allows states to 
categorize and track individuals who are deemed to be dangerous, in order to 
bring about their bureaucratic control through spatial seclusion. The unemployed, 
the unemployable and the undesirable typically fall into the category of persons 
whose actions can come to be regarded as examples of ‘offensive behaviour’ 
(Turner, 2006a). In the United Kingdom, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act of 2003 
gave extra-ordinary powers to various authorities to create zones from which 
persons deemed to be likely to cause an offence can be excluded. These zones 
were also designed to prevent youths from ‘hanging about’. The Act also intro-
duced penalties for beggars by making begging a modifiable offence. The Act 
creates provisions, not to solve or remove crimes, but to put them outside the 
social world of virtuous citizens, thereby achieving an emotional seclusion.

The Emergence of the Enclave Society

Between 1348 and 1359, the Black Death killed around 30 per cent of the 
European and Asian population. One response to infectious disease was to compel 
ships to spend 40 days in isolation prior to entering a city’s harbour. This practice 
came to be known as ‘quarantine’ from the medieval French, *une quarantaine de*
jours. In fact, quarantine became a standard response to leprosy, syphilis, yellow fever and Asiatic cholera. In Britain, parliamentary Acts were regularly employed to control disease throughout the eighteenth century and, in 1752, a quarantine clause was introduced into an Act regulating Levantine trade. With the approach of cholera, Parliament brought in far-reaching provisions to enforce strict quarantine restrictions. Throughout the nineteenth century, various international pieces of legislation were introduced to control the global spread of infectious disease.

The notion of ‘colonial enclaves’ of disease also played an important role in British imperial responses to epidemic threats in British India (Arnold, 1993). The Royal Commission of 1863 demonstrated that British soldiers had not successfully adapted to the Indian environment and had a much higher rate of infection from hepatitis than was the case for Indian troops. In Bengal, British soldiers were 60 times more likely to die from hepatitis than their Indian counterparts. The authorities struggled with limited success to protect the British soldier from alcoholism and venereal disease by creating medical enclaves to safeguard their health.

By the middle of the twentieth century, it had become evident that the infectious diseases of childhood had declined with improvements in the standard of living and the development of effective vaccination. These demographic changes in society were associated with the increasing importance of geriatric diseases – stroke, heart attack, cancer and diabetes – as the leading causes of death. It appeared that threats from infectious diseases for the developed world had largely disappeared. This comforting scenario was shattered by the onset of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s. A new retrovirus was identified in 1983, and two further types were identified in 1986 and 1994. The speed at which HIV spread through the homosexual communities of North America and Europe, the heterosexual populations of Africa, the underclass of Russia and eastern Europe, and in various provinces of the People’s Republic of China showed that there was no single pattern of infection, but it did illustrate the global interconnectivity of modern illness (Turner, 2004). In a period of global communication and transport, disease does not recognize national borders. An outbreak of SARS in 2003 spread rapidly from Beijing to Toronto, dramatically demonstrating the global character of modern disease. Contemporary analysis of the possible impact of bird flu suggests that up to three hundred million people could die from a global pandemic (Garrett, 2005). The spread of infectious disease is also closely associated with the global conduct of war. The deadly disease Ebola was often carried through central Africa by guerrilla troops such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, a messianic rebel army that blends Christianity and Islam, passing between southern Sudan and Uganda in 2003. The globalization of modern epidemics indicates that quarantine will remain an important strategy for the containment of disease, albeit a traditional response. The same can be said for the construction of walls to exclude undesirable individuals of groups.

In 215 BC, the Chinese Emperor decided to join together a series of existing fortifications to create a great military wall to protect the Empire against the barbarians. With the construction of the Great Wall of China, the Chinese
military forces found themselves confronted not by a series of divided tribes, but by aggressive nomadic people they called the Hu and the Hiong-nu, who now for the first time formed a coherent nation. At this time the Emperor raised an inscription that declared he had ‘thrown down and destroyed the internal ramparts and the outer walls (of the principalities) . . . he has smoothed out and suppressed difficulties and obstacles’ (Garret, 1930: 101). The walls of medieval European cities were more modest. In medieval Paris fortifications were created out of staves driven into the ground. However, walls had to be continuously improved as military technology became more sophisticated. On 13 August 1961, East German security forces sealed off most of the crossing points in Berlin, erecting barbed wire and concrete blocks to stop the flow of people and traffic. This wall was in reality to stop the substantial exodus of East Germans to the West. Between 1949 and 1960, more than 3.5 million had fled the GDR. Patrolling the Berlin Wall required some 14,000 guards and over 6,000 dogs. The collapse of the Wall in November 1989 coincided with the break-up of the Soviet bloc itself.

Like quarantine, walls are a primitive form of enclavement. It has been argued that the Berlin Wall was a throwback to the Second World War and to the origins of the Cold War. However, new walls are going up in Baghdad, the West Bank, Botswana, Padua and along the Mexican-American border. The left-wing city council of Padua has erected a steel barrier to divide the respectable side of the city from the high crime neighbourhoods which are rife with illegal drugs associated with an influx of Nigerian and Tunisian migrants. In the Spanish enclave of Melilla in Morocco, the Guardia Civil fired shots at asylum seekers attempting to climb a 6m fence. In San Diego, a wall also protects Californian citizens from immigrants crossing illegally from Tijuana (Paquot, 2006). According to Prince Nayif, the Saudi Interior Minister, in 2007, Saudi Arabia will build a security fence some 900km long to secure the border with Iraq, where the Saudis fear they will also suffer eventually from the political chaos that has engulfed Baghdad. In the Iraqi capital itself, the Americans have already built a ‘green zone’ with a 10-mile-long wall. In October 2006, George W. Bush signed the Secure Fence Act which anticipates the creation of a 700-mile barrier to deter illegal migrants. In Kashmir, the Indian government has created a similar defensive structure against intrusions.

Modern walls are typically security arrangements for the enclavement for migrants, especially unwanted migrants. Global migration in the twentieth century has clearly played a major role in the emergence of an enclave society. This is a central paradox of labour migration. The labour markets of the advanced economies depend on high levels of migration, because they have ageing populations, their own labour force is not sufficiently mobile, and workers in the developed world are reluctant to take on unskilled and low-paid jobs. Markets need migrant labour, but democratic governments, responding in part to electoral pressures and media campaigns, cannot be seen to be too lenient towards high levels of migration. In modern politics after 9/11, there is a tendency to conflate three categories of mobile persons: migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. In a number
of European countries, conservative right-wing parties have successfully mobilized electorates against liberal policies towards labour mobility and porous frontiers. While migrants contribute significantly to economic growth, they are often thought to be parasitic on the host society. They do not fit easily into a welfare model of contributory rights.

In general, Western governments have been reluctant to grant citizenship status to migrants without stringent criteria of membership and naturalization is often a slow, grudging and uncertain process. Furthermore, dual citizenship has been historically regarded as an anomaly. There is an increasing level of official scepticism about the political wisdom of permitting such pragmatic arrangements as quasi-citizenship, dual citizenship and other flexible arrangements, because these forms of citizenship are thought to undermine the hegemonic model of exclusionary political membership. In the United States, this type of criticism has also become associated with arguments against policies of affirmative action. Citizenship is increasingly reserved for the employed and the employable, leading to further residential segregation in the United States and deepening the divisions between white, black and Hispanic communities (Crowder et al., 2006). Furthermore, the federal government in the United States is currently planning to revise the list of 96 questions laid down as the citizenship test by the 1986 legislation. The proposals for the new test include 144 questions which are far more demanding than the existing range. The new questions require aspiring citizens to understand what is meant by, for example, 'the rule of law' or 'inalienable rights'. Similar debates are characteristic of changing attitudes towards migrants in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia.

Any theory of immobility needs to consider the role of religion in global diasporas and multiculturalism. Religious identities tend to be transnational, and offer alternative matrices of self-definition and identification that are not based on territorial notions of state membership. There is, as a result, a tension between the transnational identities of many neo-fundamentalist religions (Christian, Muslim, and Jewish but also Hindu and Buddhist) and the state-based identities of national citizenship. In the traditional American pattern of assimilation, Protestant, Catholic and Jew became merely variations on a common theme of civil religion and secular membership (Herberg, 1955). The globalization of diasporic communities based on transnational religious identities presents a new challenge to these national narratives of belonging (Turner, 2006b). In Europe, and possibly in America, there is no civil religion as such to which Muslim, Christian or Hindu communities could readily become attached. The idea of European common citizenship has been, at least for the time being, postponed by the rejection of the Constitution in the referenda in France and the Netherlands, and by the failure to agree on a common economic budget in 2005. This negative vote has either delayed or cancelled the possibility of the entry of Turkey into the European Union. The problems of Turkish membership are in any case compounded by unresolved issues over Cyprus. Associated with the 'no vote' is a fear of the expansion of radical Islam into Europe, and the consequence of any delay of Turkish membership is to define Fortress Europe as essentially an
exclusive cultural enclave (Delanty, 2006). Finally, the political debate started in Britain by Jack Straw, MP for Blackburn in Lancashire, which demands that Muslim women should not wear the veil in public places on the grounds that it is thereby impossible to judge their intentions and emotions, further reinforces the principle that Muslims (unlike Christians, Hindus or Buddhists) constitute a unique problem in civil society. It is necessary that their faces be exposed to the Western gaze. Any legislation or administrative order to prohibit the wearing of the *niqab* in public spaces will have the effect of immobilizing pious women, locking them into private, domestic spaces.

The modern state therefore has a contradictory relationship to multiculturalism and migration, on the one hand, and to order and sovereignty, on the other. In a capitalist society, the state needs to encourage labour migration, porous boundaries and minimal limitations on labour fluidity and flexibility. Labour market flexibility is seen to be one viable policy response to rigidities in labour supply, and hence governments come under pressure from economic elites to reduce the resistance of labour to globalization, and clearly one solution to this problem is to import labour. But the state also has an overriding interest in asserting its own sovereignty, and hence wants to impose a unity on society in the shape of a great moral arch (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). Its economic interests have the unintended consequence of producing cultural diversity through labour migration, but its need for sovereignty requires a moral unity, and hence the state seeks the reduction of cultural complexity through the assimilation of the migrant. Given the conflicts surrounding identity politics and concerns over public order, modern states are giving priority to security over welfare and to public order over civil liberties. In part, this situation explains the new emphasis on civic integration over multicultural difference. The modern state is increasingly committed to the notion that sovereignty resides in the capacity to make decisions in a situation of political emergency (Schmitt, 1996). Enclavement is a primary expression of sovereignty in excluding aliens without and undesirables within.

**Biological Enclavement**

For Agamben, in his *Homo Sacer*, the fundamental classification of classical society was not necessarily between the sacred and the profane, but between physis (nature) and *nemos* (order), or more precisely between *zoe* or natural life and *bios* or the forms of life. Human beings are animals who have created the polis as a form of political life. Agamben's central interest is in the problematic character of political power of the state as sovereignty, which resides in *nemos*, or law, in the ordering (*Ordnung*) of the polis. Nature is characterized by its violence; the polis, by its order, and yet the paradox of sovereignty is that it requires a monopoly of violence. The Hobbesian sovereign overcomes the state of nature, by incorporating that violence into its power to order men and things. This idea that the normative authority of sovereign power has to disguise its origins in violence was central to Jacques Derrida's analysis of the paradoxical
features of power or force (Gewalt). This notion of the paradoxical relationship between law, state and authority ran throughout Derrida's philosophical works from *On Grammatology* (1976) to his later lectures on religion (Derrida and Vatimo, 1998). Derrida's thesis was that, insofar as the law is a command of the state and insofar as the state has a monopoly of force in a given territory, then the legitimacy of the law requires that the origins of law have to be disguised. Law pretends to have no history and no context; it is a form of pure authority (Beardsworth, 1996). If law has its historical origins in state violence, how can law be an ordering of violence without itself being an instance of arbitrary violence?

The contemporary debate about the nature of the political that has occupied modern political philosophy for some decades has been engaged with the legacy of Carl Schmitt (1996). Writing in the context of the erosion of authority in the liberal Weimar state, Schmitt defined sovereignty as an exception to the law, and as the capacity to declare that an emergency exists. The state had the power to bring about order in the face of an emergency by exercising its monopoly of violence. Schmitt was a student of Weber's political sociology, which distinguished two forms of power – symbolic and physical (Weber, 1968). The Church is that institution that has symbolic power to order society and individual lives, operating through forms of ritual and discipline to control souls. The state is that institution that has a monopoly of violence in a given territory, operating through law and coercion to police bodies. Because Weber adhered to a positive theory of law, he defined law as the command of the state. Are laws legitimate? When they are issued by the authority of the state, then they have legality, but Weber could not ultimately solve the dual problems of legality and legitimacy of state power. Schmitt, in the context of the Weimar crisis, raised some awkward issues for liberal parliamentary democracy, and rewrote the rule of law as rule by decree in his *Legality and Legitimacy* (2004) by allocating extraordinary powers to the office of the President, thereby paving the way for Hitler’s ‘leadership-democracy’ (Führer-Demokratie).

There is much debate as to the extent of Agamben’s dependence on Schmitt (Norris, 2005), but there is no question that he belongs to this tradition of political thought in his analysis of the sovereignty of the state. He is also deeply influenced by Michel Foucault’s theory of ‘biopolitics’ and his idea of ‘governmentality’. Sociologists have recognized the importance of Foucault’s concept of governmentality as a paradigm for understanding the micro-processes of administration and control within which self-regulation and social regulation are integrated. The concept of governmentality, which appears late in Foucault’s writing, provides an integrating theme that addressed the socio-political practices or technologies by which the self is constructed through discipline. Governmentality refers to the administrative structures of the state, the patterns of self-government of individuals and the regulatory principles of modern society. Governmentality has become the common foundation of modern political rationality in which the administrative systems of the state have been extended in order to maximize productive control over the demographic processes of the population. This extension of administrative rationality was first concerned with
demographic processes of birth, morbidity and death, and later with the psychological health of the population. The administrative state has made eugenics an essential feature of modern government, despite the fact that the very word ‘eugenics’ is normally hidden from view, given its bad historical connections with genocide.

Governmentality is the generic term for these micro-power relations whereby bodies are controlled by the state through local institutions and authorities. It has been defined as ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target populations’ (Foucault, 1991: 102). The importance of this definition is that historically the power of the modern state is less concerned with sovereignty over things (land and wealth) and more concerned with maximizing the productive power of administration over populations, the human body and reproduction. Furthermore, Foucault interpreted the exercise of administrative power in productive terms that is enhancing population potential through state support for the family. The state’s involvement in and regulation of reproductive technology are further examples of governmentality in which the desire of couples to reproduce is enhanced through the state’s support of new technologies. In these examples, the eugenic policies of the state are implicit or hidden within the benign interventions of the general practitioner, the social worker or the marriage counsellor. Birth and death become key events in the exercise of state power at the level of everyday life.

To this discussion of sovereignty, we must add the analysis of space. One distinction between religion and politics, between sacred and sovereign, is the question of the territorialization of power. This question of space is nicely illustrated by the distinction between Ordnung and Ortung. In his account of sovereignty, Agamben (1998: 19) says:

What is at issue in the sovereign exception is not so much the control and neutralization of an excess as the creation and definition of the very space in which the juridico-political order can have validity. In this sense, the sovereign exception is the fundamental localization (Ortung) which does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but instead traces a threshold (the state of exception) between the two, on the basis of which outside and inside, the normal situation and chaos, enter into those complex topological relations that make the validity of the juridical order possible.

What has this to do with enclavement? Agamben has argued that the state of emergency historically was illustrated by the concentration camp, starting with the use of such camps by the British in the war against the Boers and then by the Nazi concentration camp. This site of detention is one in which law is suspended and the inmates exist without the protection of rights. For Agamben, the state of emergency has become a normal method of the exercise of sovereignty, even by democracies.

His arguments have been highly controversial, because he claims that the Patriot Act recognized a state of emergency and that Guantanamo Bay has the
same legal and political status as the Nazi concentration camps. When the state of emergency becomes permanent in a war against terrorism, then the city becomes a camp, and the inmates of these extra-judicial zones are exposed to ‘bare life’ that is they are expelled from \textit{bios} to \textit{zöe}. These camps offer the state the opportunity of indefinite containment for anybody who is deemed to be a potential threat (Butler, 2006). The principle of indefinite detention which Guantanamo expresses means that the camp offers the state a strategy of political storage whereby, even were the inmates to be tried and found not guilty, they could still be detained. The inmates are not covered by the Geneva Convention according to White House lawyers since they did not belong to ‘regular armies’. When questioned about the legal status of the ‘detainees’, Donald Rumsfeld said that his aim was to keep these people off the streets rather than answer abstract points of law. In this sense, the inmates are in permanent storage.

**Enclavement and the New Xenophobia**

This new system of enclavement involving sequestration, storage and seclusion is said to be largely a consequence of global migration, especially the presence of illegal migrants, and 9/11 and the war on terror, but we might look for deeper and more complex problems surrounding the decline of hospitality which is also a product of an enclave society. In his discussion of the ancient norms of hospitality, Jacques Derrida (2000), in describing the rights of the stranger, has asserted that ethics is fundamentally hospitality. In Latin, a stranger/guest is called \textit{hostis} and \textit{hospes} (Benveniste, 1973). While \textit{hospes} is the root of ‘hospitality’, \textit{hostis} is an ‘enemy’. Both ‘guest’ and ‘enemy’ derive from ‘stranger’, and the idea of ‘favourable stranger’ evolved eventually into ‘guest’, but ‘hostile stranger’ became the enemy. More precisely, the idea of a stranger is closely related to conceptions about rights and membership of the household. The notion of \textit{peregrinus} referred to a category of person peregrinating outside the boundaries of a political territory, \textit{hostis} was a stranger within the city, but was nevertheless recognized as a person enjoying equal rights with Roman citizens. \textit{Hostis} was always bound by an exchange of gifts that created mutual obligation through reciprocity. Gifts can of course also be competitive and aggressive. They compel as well as oblige us to perform certain acts, but the point of this argument is that \textit{hostis}, unlike \textit{peregrinus}, is a near and palpable, not a distant and nebulous relationship. In the ancient world, strangers were people who, residing in our neighbourhood, could be bound to us by shared ritual activities. These arrangements reduced the likelihood of mistrust and conflict between strangers and host community.

Comparable issues were to be found in the Greek concept of \textit{xenos} (stranger) from which we derive ‘xenophobia’. The notion of \textit{xenos} defined a pact requiring specific obligations, which can be inherited by subsequent generations. These \textit{xenia} or social contracts came under the protection of Zeus Xenios, and consisted of an exchange of gifts between the contracting parties, who thereby bound their descendants to the agreement. In ancient Greece, both kings and commoners
could be obligated by these contracts with (friendly) strangers. With the emergence of the state and the decline of the ancient world, these customary relationships were replaced by new classifications of what is inside and what is outside the *civitas*. In part, these ritualized relationships were replaced by secular citizenship, namely a secular system of contributory rights and duties that bind people to the nation state.

On the basis of this argument, one can safely differentiate between ‘old xenophobia’ and ‘new xenophobia’. The former refers to a set of social conditions that existed in ancient society prior to the creation of the modern state. In traditional xenophobia, the stranger as an enemy is nevertheless a clearly recognized person, residing proximately, in our midst, or adjacent to our community. A palpable and recognized figure, the stranger was a person with whom one could exchange gifts. Being welcomed to the fireplace, the foundation of the ancient city, he was to accept and share with us the worship of the fireside gods. Relationships with this stranger were regulated by ritual customs and practices and the exchange of gifts was typically institutionalized by strictly defined activities of gift giving. This reciprocal relationship was, however, ambiguous and unstable – a mixture of cooperative and threatening behaviour, that was only partially regulated by rituals. These relationships could always break down into hostile confrontation, including outright war. However, warfare in ancient society was typically ritualized behaviour, not leading inevitably to the systematic extermination of the enemy. As a result of warfare, the stranger might well become a domestic slave, or alternatively after a series of skirmishes more peaceful relations could be re-established. Ethnic cleansing was uncommon in ancient societies, because such forms of organized killing require considerable planning and co-ordination, namely the involvement of the modern state and its bureaucratic administration. Genocide is a modern strategy to eliminate a whole population, and not a military strategy of warring gangs of men. The word ‘genocide’ did not come into use until 1944 when it was invented by the Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to describe the rule of the Axis powers in occupied Europe.

These ancient norms of * xenia * can be contrasted with modern circumstances, namely where citizens establish legal relationships with strangers by creating membership through various forms of naturalization. With the growth of states, a new system of classificatory niches emerges, including stateless person, refugee, asylum-seeker, guest worker and illegal migrant. The nomad has been replaced by a battery of classificatory roles indicating his or her lack of permanence. This political development is related to the rise of the modern state which brought to an end the traditional routes of casual migratory workers moving around Europe on a seasonal basis in search of part-time employment. These migratory movements typically followed the shoals of herring around northern Europe or corresponded with harvest time. In creating passports and strict membership based on formal citizenship, modern states converted such seasonal workers (or guests) into aliens who require passports or work permits to enter a national territory. While the transition from the ancient world to the nation state produced major changes in identity, there were also continuities with the old world.
citizenship also implicitly involves a system of exchange based on contributory rights. Through various contributions such as employment, public service and parenting, the citizen can enjoy a set of corresponding entitlements (to vote or to receive welfare benefits or social security). In principle, strangers can become part of this network of rights and duties, if they also begin to participate as citizens in the host society.

These ancient relationships between host and stranger have been transformed by globalization and a new type of xenophobia has emerged. With globalization (especially the globalization of labour markets), modern societies have all become to some degree plural multicultural societies. With the global development of diasporic communities, the stranger is now both proximate and distant, because he or she is involved in a global network of communities extending around the world. Migrant labour is typically connected to economically marginal societies or communities, and their remittances are often necessary to support distant communities. Where migrant labour does not become integrated into the host community through marriage, work or citizenship, they can remain isolated from the mainstream. Indeed, with some forms of multiculturalism, cultural differences become institutionalized and produce fragmented, isolated and underprivileged social groups. Their children become part of a diversified, marginalized, urban underclass.

These migrant communities have been increasingly augmented by a flow of stateless people, refugees, asylum seekers, boat people and the victims of failed states and civil wars. The growth of global cities has been accompanied by an underclass of illegal or semi-legal migrants and refugees who work primarily in the informal economy, and come to constitute a disprivileged ‘weight of the world’ (Bourdieu, 1993). The stranger is now an anonymous, displaced person without citizenship rights, and a member of an underclass that is seen by the state as simply a recruiting ground for criminals and terrorists. The stranger in the global economy is somebody who is recruited not to service in the formal economy of society, but to a life in prisons, detention camps, inter-state zones, departure lounges and a variety of other intermediate, quasi-legal arenas.

Terrorism has obviously contributed significantly to this fear of the stranger in our midst who is not connected to us and whose face may be obscured by the hijab, the burqa, or chador. Because the bombings in London were performed not by outsiders, but by citizens, the aftermath of 7/7 may be, at least for Europeans, more significant than 9/11. The bombings and attempted bombings in London were undertaken by the children of migrants and asylum seekers, who were, at least formally, British citizens. In the new xenophobia, as the ‘friendly stranger’ has become ‘the hostile stranger’, every citizen has become a potential enemy within. The essential political condition for the rise of the new xenophobia is a situation in which the majority feels that it is under attack and that its culture and way of life are threatened by social groups whom it does not understand, with whom it cannot identify, and consequently does not recognize. The threatened majority harbours the suspicion that its own state protects strangers through liberal laws that allow criminal activities to flourish.
Conclusion: Cosmopolitanism and the Rights of Mobility

There are various forms of enclavement that are relatively unproblematic. Gated communities for the elderly and the vulnerable (even where this amounts to a form of social storage or sequestration) are not necessarily a threat to civil society or to civil liberties. Similarly quarantine against the spread of SARS or avian influenza can be justified as simply a pragmatic response to a potential epidemic. However, the fences and barriers which governments are erecting against outsiders have a more sinister aspect and are potentially a challenge to civil liberties. We have seen that there appears to be a general fashion among governments to build walls to defend their citizens against illegal migrants, terrorists, drug dealers and other undesirable social groups. While what we might call ‘border theories’ (Rumsford, 2006) suggest that the new enthusiasm for enclavement is primarily a response to the pressures of illegal migration and the threat of terrorism, it is generally agreed that walls are ineffectual and expensive measures to achieve immobility. Bioterrorism is now a major threat to modern states. Government concerns about the use of biological weapons have increased as a result of the Sarin nerve gas attack by a Japanese religious cult that killed 12 and injured 5000 people in Tokyo's underground some six years ago, and the anthrax attack in the United States in 2001. The US Army has identified smallpox, anthrax and botulism as organisms that can easily be disseminated in a civilian population. Walls are unlikely to protect us from bioterrorism and therefore their function tends to be symbolic rather than strategic; they are to reassure the public that governments are taking terrorism seriously. Walls and other examples of enclavement are produced by a new strain of xenophobia, which strongly counteracts the cosmopolitanism which many sociologists have seen as an almost inevitable outcome of transnationalism.

Defending an ethic of cosmopolitanism against the background of an enclave society is highly problematic and uncertain (Turner, 2006c). The underlying rights of a cosmopolis are what we might call ‘rights of mobility’. Many modern rights claims are implicitly or explicitly about crossing borders or creating new settlements – rights of migrant labour, rights to hold a passport, rights to enter a country, rights of asylum, rights of refugees and other rights to residence, rights to marry outside one’s state, or the right to buy property or invest in other states. These rights were supported by Western governments during the Cold War but there is now a marked turn against these individual liberties in the age of terrorism. The growth of enclave societies makes the search for cosmopolitan values and institutions a pressing need, but the current trend towards the erection of walls against the dispossessed and the underclass appears to be inexorable.

References


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